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Deaf Children’s Understanding of Emotions: Desires Take Precedence
Carolien Rieffe and Mark Meerum Terwogt
Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Deaf children frequently have trouble understanding other people’s emotions. It has been
suggested that an impaired theory of mind can account for this. This research focused on the
spontaneous use of mental states in explaining other people’s emotions by 6- and 10-year-old
deaf children as compared to their hearing peers. Within both age-groups deaf children
referred to others’ beliefs as often as their hearing peers and their references to desires even
exceeded those of hearing children. This relative priority for the expression of desires is
discussed in terms of possible communicative patterns of deaf children. The specific
problems that deaf childrenmeet in their daily communicationmight explain their abundance
of desire-references : plausibly, they give a high priority to stress their own desires and needs
unambiguously.
Keywords: Child development, emotion recognition, hearing loss, theory of mind.
Abbreviations: SSD: Sign-Supported Dutch; ToM: theory of mind.
Introduction
The expression and understanding of emotions are
major factors in everyday communication (Frijda, 1986).
Socially inadequate expression or impoverished under-
standing of other people’s emotions can easily create a
climate of interpersonal misunderstandings. In deaf
children, some authors (e.g. Montanini Manfredi, 1993;
van Eldik, 1994; Vostanis, Hayes, Du Feu, & Warren,
1997) claim to detect a relatively large amount of distrust,
stubbornness, and other behavioural problems. Deaf
children’s alleged difficulties with the expression (Odom,
Blanton, & Laukhuf, 1973) and understanding of emo-
tions may have been instrumental to this phenomenon.
As far as the understanding of emotions is concerned, it is
suggested that their problems might be quite funda-
mental : deaf children suffer from a delayed or impaired
theory of mind (Peterson & Siegel, 1995, 1998). A
functional theory of mind (ToM) implies that children
acknowledge (1) that people make their own subjective
mental representation of the objective reality, (2) that
these representations depend on people’s own set of
beliefs and desires, and (3) that people’s actions and their
emotional reactions to what happens to them are to be
understood in terms of, or predicted from, these sub-
jective beliefs and desires.
Most hearing children understand when they are aged
3 that other people’s actions are governed by their desires
and beliefs. The understanding that emotions also depend
on subjective desires and beliefs appears somewhat later,
when they are aged 5. At this age, children accurately
predict a happy emotion when the protagonist receives
what she desired, and an unhappy emotion when the
protagonist is frustrated in fulfilling her desire (Wellman,
1990). These young children also accurately predict
others’ emotions when protagonists’ preferences for one
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item over the other (e.g. milk vs. coke) are alternated
(P. L. Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke,
1989). In other words, they appreciate the fact that
different people can have different desires or that others’
desires can differ from their own. Additionally, these
young children also show the capacity to attribute beliefs
to the protagonist that differ from their own. In this
respect, false beliefs are frequently used (Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). A false belief refers to another’s mental
representation of reality that does not correspond with
reality, nor with what the protagonist knows to be the
case. P. L. Harris et al. (1989) provided children aged
4–6 years with situations in which the protagonist falsely
believed that a Smartie box contained Smarties, whereas
(as participants knew) the Smartie box actually contained
pencils. Participants were asked to predict how Bertie the
bear would feel when he was given the box, but had not
yet discovered its actual contents. Most emotion pre-
dictions by the 4-year-olds (75%) were based on their
own belief and stated that Bertie the bear would be
unhappy, as if he could know that the box did not contain
Smarties. Yet, 75% of the emotion predictions by the 6-
year-olds were based on the bear’s false belief and stated
that he would be happy receiving the box.
A replication of the Smartie experiment among deaf
children seemed to indicate a delay (Steeds, Rowe, &
Dowker, 1997) : 70% of the participants (aged 5–12
years, mean 9 years) accurately predicted that Bertie
would be happy receiving the Smartie box. Although this
result is compatible to that of hearing 6-year-olds, it can
be expected to lag behind the performances of a hearing
group with a mean age of 9 years. Also other false belief
tasks showed the impaired results of deaf children: 65%
to 90% of deaf children with normal intelligence (mean
age 10 years) failed simple false belief tasks that were
accurately responded to by hearing 5-year-olds (Peterson
& Siegel, 1995, 1998; Russell et al., 1998).
Less is known about deaf children’s understanding of
the relationship between desires and emotions. The only
study that addresses this topic (Steeds et al., 1997)
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suggests little impairment of deaf children in this area.
Note, however, that hearing children also perform better
on desire tasks (‘‘Bertie likes Smarties. How does Bertie
feel when he receives Smarties? ’’) than on belief tasks,
due to a less complex task structure (Rieffe, 1998). A key
difference between beliefs and desires is that beliefs can
misrepresent reality, whereas desires can only be more or
less desirable. Different people can have different desires,
and they can each be more or less acceptable in the eyes
of the participant. Yet, different people can have different
beliefs, but only one is true. Until now, ToM difficulties
among deaf children have mainly been demonstrated in
relation to beliefs and little is known about their
understanding of desires. More complex desire tasks that
also cause more difficulties for hearing children, for
example when the protagonist’s desire conflicts with the
participant’s beliefs about desirability, such as a desire
for Brussels sprouts (Rieffe, 1998), have not yet been
administered with deaf participants.
There has also been attention to the development of a
ToM among children with autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam,
1989). The impaired ToM performances of children with
autism are frequently explained in terms of a pathological
deficit that results in mindblindness (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Carruthers, 1996). Mindblindness implies that children
live in a world in which mental activities are not
recognised. Consequently, children with autism are said
to also lack the capacity to attribute mental states to
others. It is argued that the specific characteristics of
children with autism, such as impaired communication,
impaired social relating, and lack of pretend play
(Kanner, 1943; Wing & Gould, 1979) can be traced back
to this fundamental deficit. In deaf children, however,
there is no reason to assume neurological deficits other
than the ones directly related to their handicap. ToM
difficulties, therefore, have to be attributed to learning
factors.
Although it is not exactly comparable, deaf children
seem to have problems in areas that are also frequently
mentioned with respect to autistic children. First, we
already mentioned their social problems. Second, pretend
play—an activity that is often mentioned as an important
prerequisite of ToM development (Leslie, 1987; P. L.
Harris, 1989)—also seems to be less imaginative in deaf
children than in hearing children (Brown, Prescott,
Rickards, & Paterson, 1997), and third, it needs no
discussion that their communication is impaired due to
their handicap. Also in the case of autism, it has been
argued that communication problems could be the result,
but also the cause, of ToM impairment (Boucher, 1996).
In deaf children, where we have no reason to expect
innate ToM deficiencies, the latter clearly seems to be the
more plausible point of view. The lack of exposure to
daily conversation (A. E. Harris, 1978; Marschark, 1993;
Peterson & Siegel, 1995) could be an important condition
for the acquisition of ToM understanding. Information
exchange through daily conversation confronts children
with the fact that different people can have different
beliefs about reality. Evidence for this argument stems
from research of Peterson and Siegel (1997, in press), who
showed that deaf childrenwith at least one family member
fluent in sign language were less impaired on ToM tasks
than deaf children who lacked such a family member.
The present research focused on deaf children’s under-
standing that emotions are governed by subjective mental
states in a way that differs from the usual ToM tasks.
More strongly than in the usual setup, this research called
upon children’s spontaneous use of conversational
means: instead of asking children to predict others’
emotions, we asked children to explain them. As P. L.
Harris (1996) points out, in the context of emotion
predictions, one could concentrate primarily on the
protagonist’s goal, thereby overlooking the protagonist’s
mental states (e.g. beliefs about reality). By contrast, in
the context of daily interactions, one might try to focus
more on mental states, because both interaction partners,
generally speaking, intend to understand one another. In
this research, we compared the extent to which deaf and
hearing children refer to mental states rather than to
situational factors as the causes of other people’s emo-
tions. Due to their shortage of spontaneous conversations
with knowledgeable others referred to earlier, deaf
children’s responses are expected to be impaired com-
pared to those of hearing children.
Additionally, we added a factor that was expected to
appeal more strongly to children’s possible tendency to
suggest the causal relationship between mental states and
emotions. Besides the explanation of typical emotions,
children were also asked to explain the protagonist’s
atypical emotions. Typical emotions—a delighted face
when a birthday cake is carried in, or a grumpy face when
a penalty is inflicted—do not require much elaboration
about specific desires and}or beliefs of the person in
question. These kinds of typical emotions can be easily
explained in terms of situational factors. However, a
situational explanation would be unsatisfactory in the
case of an unexpected emotional reaction (a grumpy face
when the birthday cake is carried in). This reaction asks
for an additional explanation, preferably in terms of the
protagonist’s experience of the situation, for example, the
assumption that the protagonist has an atypical desire
(‘‘She doesn’t like cake’’) or a different belief (‘‘She is
angry, because she thinks that they won’t allow her to eat
cake’’). Therefore, if children have an understanding of
the fact that other’s emotions are caused by mental states,
the explanation of others’ atypical emotions should most
strongly encourage both deaf and hearing children to
mention this subjective element.
Method
Participants
Twenty-three severely and profoundly deaf children and 85
hearing children participated in this study. The group of deaf
children consisted of ten 6-year-olds (mean age 6–11, SD 6
months) and thirteen 10-year-olds (mean age 10–11, SD 5
months) who came from a primary school for the deaf. There
were 13 boys and 10 girls, all of whom had a prelingual hearing
loss. All children were audiologically diagnosed as being
profoundly deaf : the mean hearing loss of 17 children was
104–42dB (SD 8–82) in the better ear ; the remaining children had
no measurable hearing. All but one had hearing parents. The
communication with their teachers was in Sign-Supported
Dutch (SSD). Apart from their deafness, they had no other
handicaps. The deaf children were in a standard educational
programme. To confirm that the deaf children were of average
IQ, assessments by the school psychologist were used (these
were available for all but one of the children). Seven children
were tested with the SON (a standard Dutch nonverbal
intelligence test, mean score 102, SD 6.8), but most children
were tested with subtests from the WISC-R. Based on their
WISC-R scores, children’s intelligence was rated by the school
psychologist as ‘‘below average’’, ‘‘average’’, or ‘‘above
average’’ for intelligence. Most children (nine) were within the
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Table 1
Content of the Six Stories, with Typical and Atypical Emotions
Story content
Typical
emotion
Atypical
emotion
1. Joris receives a present from his mother, and he doesn’t know
what is in it
Happy Angry
2. Sheila goes outside to play hide and seek with other children Happy Afraid
3. Linda was promised a trip to the zoo, but she has to stay
at home now
Angry}Sad Happy
4. Walter’s dog is a bit ill today Sad Afraid
5. Petra sees a person in a dark living room, who she cannot identify Afraid Happy
6. Madelain lies in bed, trying to sleep, when she hears a strange noise Afraid Angry
‘‘average’’ category and six were considered to be ‘‘above
average’’.
An additional 42 hearing 6-year-olds (mean age 6:3, range
5:9 to 7: 2) and 43 hearing 10-year-olds (mean age 10:4, range
9:8 to 10:11) participated. Half of the participants in each age
group were male. These children came from primary schools
located around Amsterdam, the Netherlands. In terms of SES
(middle to higher class children) these groups were comparable
to the SES of the deaf children. No intelligence measures were
collected, but according to the teachers of one school the
intelligence of their pupils could be described as average,
whereas teachers of the second school judged their school
population as average and slightly above average, respectively.
Material
The material consisted of six stories that described emotion-
eliciting situations. Two stories were designed to provoke
happiness, two to provoke sadness or anger, and two to provoke
fear. A content indication of each of the stories is provided in
Table 1. After hearing each story, participants were asked how
the protagonist would feel and why (question 1 and 2). If
participants failed to identify an emotion, they were asked ‘‘Do
you think [nameprotagonist] feels happy, sad, angry or afraid? ’’
The order of the suggested emotions was randomised to avoid
biased responses. Once participants had predicted and ex-
plained an emotion, the experimenter said that the protagonist
felt differently and named an atypical emotion. The atypical
emotions (happiness, anger, or fear) were fixed. The exper-
imenter asked participants to explain this atypical emotion
(question 3).
Female protagonists were used for stories that involved fear
as a typical emotion in order to avoid ‘‘macho’’ responses. We
had noticed in previous studies that few boys (of all age-groups)
had suggested fear during introductory conversations. An
example of a story (anger}sadness) is :
This is Linda. Linda’s father and mother had said that
they would go to the zoo. But now Linda’s mother says
that they cannot go and that they will have to stay at home.
How does Linda feel now she hears that she will not be
going to the zoo, but has to stay at home? (1) And why
does Linda feel … ? (2)
Yes, I would have thought so too. But Linda does not
feel [emotion given by the participant]. Linda feels happy
now she isn’t going to the zoo and is staying at home. How
come Linda feels happy? (3)
Procedure
All participants were tested individually. The deaf children
were tested using SSD by a hearing female staff member who
they were not familiar with. The instructions given to the
hearing children were accurately translated into SSD and no
child gave any indication that they did not understand the
instructions. It should be noted that some practioners suggest
that deaf children have conceptual problems with ‘‘why’’
questions. However, the deaf children’s responses revealed no
conceptual problems with these questions.
In order to make participants familiar with the emotional
concepts that would be used in the stories, they were asked if
they sometimes experienced happiness, sadness, anger, and fear,
and if they could give an example of such an occasion. The
experimenter helped children who found it difficult to provide
examples. For example: ‘‘When is your birthday? Do you feel
happy then? Okay, and could you think of something else
now?’’ The order of the six presented stories was randomised.
The sessions with hearing children were tape recorded, and
the sessions with deaf children were also recorded by video. The
deaf children’s experimenter verbalised children’s responses.
Transcriptions were derived from the tapes after the sessions. A
deaf person compared the written text with the video recordings.
No inaccuracies were found.
Scoring
In order to ascertain the extent to which children attributed
mental states to the protagonist in their emotion-explanations,
responses were assigned to one of the following categories.
(1) Fact beliefs : This category was applied when the participant
referred to the protagonist’s beliefs about the situation. For
example: ‘‘She is happy, because she thinks that her friend
will come over to play now she isn’t going to the zoo’’.
(2) Desires & preferences : This category was applied to answers
that referred to the protagonist’s desires. For example:
‘‘She wants to stay at home and play with her friend’’.
Value beliefs, that is, beliefs that do not refer to reality but
to someone’s preferences, also fell into this category.
(3) Situational : Answers that only elaborated on the situation
or referred to another situation without reference to a
protagonist’s mental state fell into this category. For
example: ‘‘She is happy because she is going to play with
her friend’’.
(4) Missing : Responses fell into this category if (a) the
participant had not predicted the typical emotion; or (b) the
answer was missing on the tape. The responses of five
participants (three 6-year-olds and two deaf children) were
excluded from further analyses, because they had two
missing values on one emotion-cluster (two happiness,
anger}sadness, or fear stories). When participants had one
missing value per emotion cluster, the remaining score was
included in the analysis.
Note that the categories for fact beliefs and desires are not
exclusive, because the response: ‘‘He thinks it is a car and he
really wants a car’’ refers to a desire and a fact belief. Responses
were then assigned to both categories. This was the case for 25
and 69 responses by deaf and hearing children respectively. All
responses were coded by two raters. The inter-rater agreement
was 96% and disagreements were resolved by discussion.
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Results
Typical Emotion Predictions
Children were presented with six stories in which they
were asked to predict the protagonist’s emotion. The
expected or typical emotion was frequently predicted,
although deaf 6-year-olds (82% correct) and hearing 6-
year-olds (90% correct) made fewer correct predictions
than 10-year-olds (both deaf and hearing: 96% correct).
Collapsed over age and group, correct emotion-pre-
dictions ranged from 92% to 97%, except for one story
in which a girl goes outside to play with other children.
The expected emotion-prediction was happy, but 18
hearing and 5 deaf children predicted that the girl was
sad, angry, or scared.
One striking difference between deaf and hearing
children was the fact that only 9}13 of the 10-year-old
deaf children immediately predicted the protagonists’
emotions when they were asked to in all six stories
(question 1), whereas all hearing children responded
correctly (except for one 6-year-old once). All deaf 6-
year-olds and four deaf 10-year-olds started to explain the
protagonist’s emotion, but they failed to tell how the
protagonist actually felt at least once. This occurred
irrespective of story-type or emotion. Children who did
not predict an emotion were asked again by the ex-
perimenter. Most deaf children who did not predict an
emotion immediately, corrected this when the exper-
imenter then asked again ‘‘Okay, but how does [s]he
feel? ’’.
Emotion Explanations
Our first consideration was the extent to which deaf
children would refer to mental states (desires or beliefs) in
their explanations of others’ emotions, when compared
to hearing children. Table 2 shows the mean scores for
mental state attributions (corrected for missing values).
Children were given a score of 0–5 for each story in which
they referred to a mental state (a desire, a belief, or both).
As there were two stories in each group children could
receive scores of 0, 0–5, or 1.
A 2(Group: deaf and hearing children)‹2(Age: 6- and
10-year-olds)‹2((A)typical) analysis of variance with
Table 2
Mean Score of Mental State Attributions as a Function of
Group‹Age‹(A)typical Emotions
Prototypical
emotion
Atypical
emotion
Deaf children
6-year-olds .60 .46
10-year-olds .74 .72
Hearing children
6-year-olds .37 .45
10-year-olds .48 .55
Table 3
Mean Score of Belief Attributions as a Function of Age‹Emotion‹(A)typical
Happiness Anger}Sadness Fear
I II I II I II
6-year-olds .07 .14 .02 .11 .42 .23
10-year-olds .15 .23 .12 .13 .48 .32
IflPrototypical emotions; IIflAtypical emotions.
repeated measures on the last factor revealed main effects
for Group, F(1,104)fl 8–74, pfl–004, and Age, F(1,104)
fl 7–23, pfl–008, and an interaction for Group and
(A)typical, F(1,104)fl 4–10, pfl–046. It can be seen in
Table 2, as expected, that 10-year-olds referred more
often to mental states than 6-year-olds. Unexpectedly,
however, Table 2 also shows that deaf children referred
more often to mental states than hearing children and this
is especially the case for typical emotions. Note, however,
that these results may be delusive, because this analysis—
based on mental state references—is insensitive con-
cerning possible distinctive desire- and belief-response
patterns. In order to obtain more specific information, we
decided to analyse the results separately for beliefs and
desires.
Beliefs. Table 3 shows the mean score of belief-
attributions as a function of Age, Emotion (happiness,
anger}sadness, fear) and (A)typical. Children were given
a score of 0–5 for each story in which they referred to a
belief. Thus, for the two stories given in each group,
children who failed to refer to beliefs scored 0, children
who referred to beliefs in only one of the stories scored
0–5, and children who referred to beliefs in both stories
scored 1. The scores in Table 3 are collapsed over group,
since there was no difference between the two. Overall,
only a few belief references were made. However, it can be
seen that 10-year-olds referred more often to beliefs than
6-year-olds. As one would expect, atypical happiness and
atypical anger}sadness evoked more belief references
than typical happiness and anger}sadness. Yet, the
response pattern for fear is quite distinct. Clearly, fear
evoked more belief attributions than the other emotions
and this is especially the case for typical fear. A 2(Age)‹
3(Emotion)‹2((A)typical) analysis of variance with re-
peated measures on the last two factors confirmed a main
effect for Age, F(1,101)fl 5–65, pfl–019, and Emotion,
F(2,202)fl 59–70, pfl–000, and an interaction for Emo-
tion‹(A)typical, F(2,202)fl 12–49, pfl–001. The dif-
ferences between typical and atypical happiness, T(105)
fl 2–46, pfl–008, and fear, T(105)fl 3–18, pfl–000,
showed significance when tested post hoc. The difference
between typical and atypical anger}sadness was in the
expected direction, but did not reach significance.
Desires. Children were given a score of 0–5 for each
story in which they referred to a desire. Thus, for the two
stories given in each group, children who failed to refer to
desires scored 0, children who referred to desires in only
one of the stories scored 0–5, and children who referred to
desires in both stories scored 1. Overall, all children
referred more frequently to desires than to beliefs.
Because the factor Age had no influence on the desire
scores, the results are collapsed over Age. A 2(Group)‹
3(Emotion)‹2(A)typical analysis of variances with re-
peated measures on the last two factors revealed two
main differences between deaf and hearing children,
which we will discuss separately.
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Table 4
Mean Score of Desire Attributions as a Function of Group
‹Emotion
Happiness Anger}Sadness Fear
Deaf children .58 .73 .13
Hearing children .27 .37 .10
Table 5
Mean Score of Desire Attributions as a Function of Group
‹(A)typical Emotions
Prototypical
emotion
Atypical
emotion
Deaf children .51 .45
Hearing childrena .19 .30
a Post hoc t-test between typical and atypical conditions
shows significance with Bonferroni correction.
The first difference concerns the different emotions and
can be seen in Table 4. In this table, the scores are
collapsed over (A)typical for deaf and hearing children. A
main effect for Group, F(1,101)fl 27–61, pfl–000, and
Emotion, F(2,202)fl 78–12, pfl–000, and an interaction
for Group‹Emotion, F(2,202) fl 11–81, pfl–000, was
revealed. Obviously, deaf children made more desire
references than hearing children. This is especially true
when they were asked to explain happiness, T(106)fl
4–18, pfl–000, and anger or sadness, T(106)fl 5–07, pfl
–000. Fear, by contrast, showed no group differences and
evoked few desire references for both deaf and hearing
children.
The second difference in results between deaf and
hearing children, Group‹(A)typical, F(1,101)fl 8–30,
pfl–005, can be seen in Table 5. Collapsed over Emotion,
this table shows that hearing children attributed more
desires to explain atypical emotions than to explain
typical emotions, T(84)fl 4–36, pfl–000. This pattern
was absent among deaf children’s responses : deaf chil-
dren’s desire-attributions did not differ significantly for
typical or atypical emotions. Post hoc t-tests confirmed
this pattern.
Finally, we want to mention an unanticipated, yet
surprising result : the responses of the deaf children were
nearly twice as long as for the hearing children (mean
response length is 290 and 159 words respectively).
Discussion
Our results showed that both deaf and hearing children
were capable of correctly predicting typical emotions.
Former studies demonstrated hearing children’s capacity
to predict basic emotions at a much earlier age (Barden,
Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980; P. L. Harris, Olthof,
Meerum Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987), but Odom et al.
(1973) found that 7- and 8-year-old deaf children still had
trouble identifying and interpreting emotional situations.
Yet, in this research, most deaf children did not always
come up with accurate emotion predictions immediately,
although this decreased with age. All deaf 6-year-olds had
to be asked again by the experimenter to name an
emotion at least once. The fact that the older deaf
children performed as well as their hearing peers might
have to do with the PATH programme (‘‘Promoting
Alternative Thinking Strategies ’’ : Greenberg & Kusche! ,
1993) that is part of the curriculum at the institute for
deaf children and which starts with 6-year-old children.
Emotional awareness and labelling emotions are im-
portant aspects of this programme (this curriculum aims
to develop self-control and interpersonal problem-solving
skills). Additionally, when they enter the institute for the
deaf, children will have more possibilities to communicate
with mature conversation partners.
The main focus of this research, however, was on the
extent to which deaf and hearing children would refer to
mental states rather than to situational factors as the
causes of other people’s emotions. For this reason, we
asked deaf and hearing children to explain the emotions
they had predicted, whereas most research on deaf
children asked them to predict others’ emotions or
behaviour. We expected deaf children to have less
understanding of the causal relationship between mental
states and emotions than hearing children (Steeds et al.,
1997). However, the different mental states, desires, and
beliefs precluded a general pattern: whereas there were
no differences between deaf and hearing children’s belief
attributions, the deaf children’s desire attributions ex-
ceeded those of the hearing children.
Beliefs (‘‘Because he thinks it is only a fake package’’)
were mentioned less than desires, but belief references
increased with age for both deaf and hearing children.
Consistently, other findings also showed that (hearing)
children understand the causal relationship between a
situation and an emotion before they are 6 years old
(Stein & Trabasso, 1989), but they rarely make belief
references to explain others’ emotions. Ten-year-olds, on
the other hand, refer increasingly to beliefs as causes of
visible emotional reactions (P. L. Harris, Olthof, &
Meerum Terwogt, 1981). Obviously, the causal relation-
ship between beliefs and emotions is more complicated,
since this requires appreciation of the fact that it is not
objective reality but one’s mental representations of
reality that causes one’s emotional reaction. This age-
related pattern was evident in our research for both deaf
and hearing children.
However, the different emotions moderate this general
pattern. Moreover, the kind of emotion influences the
extent to which children attribute desires or beliefs. Fear
evoked fewer desire attributions, but more belief attri-
butions, than happiness, anger, and sadness. Fear is
experienced in anticipation of possible harm (Izard,
1991). Consequently, the protagonist’s lack of knowledge
about the situation was frequently suggested as a cause
for fear ‘‘She doesn’t know who it is ’’, which explains the
relatively frequent use of belief attributions. Probably,
participants considered it pointless to express the uni-
versal desire for physical safety in fearful situations,
which explains the lack of desire statements in the case of
fear.
The fact that the results of deaf children were not
inferior to those of hearing children with respect to belief
references, whereas deaf children showed impaired results
on other belief tasks (Peterson & Siegel, 1995, 1998;
Russell et al., 1998; Steeds et al., 1997), might have to do
with the difference in task: explaining versus predicting
emotions. Especially for deaf children, this might be an
important factor. Deaf children participate less in daily
conversations that concentrate around mental states.
Their limited access to everyday conversations might
cause deaf children to react more briefly and to the point
when they are asked for a prediction of others’ emotions.
They might head directly for the final outcome of the
story—the fulfilment of the protagonist’s desire—without
regard to the protagonist’s beliefs (P. L. Harris, 1996). In
606 C. RIEFFE and M. MEERUM TERWOGT
other words, emotion prediction tasks might elicit a
pragmatic line of reasoning in deaf children: the actual
content of the Smartie box will eventually result in the
emotional reaction of the protagonist.
The explanation of emotions, on the other hand, does
not ask children to choose between two possible re-
sponses, as is the case for the emotion prediction tasks
(i.e. happy or unhappy). Instead, children are required to
invent and talk about possible scenarios that could
explain protagonists’ emotions. The fact that deaf chil-
dren’s responses were twice as long as those of hearing
children indicates that deaf children were particularly
engaged by this task. This outcome strengthens our point
in the next paragraph, that deaf children’s limited
interaction time in their daily lives influences their
communication: they might not have the possibility to
communicate at length very often. Moreover, emotion
explanations do not ask for a correct prediction, because
the protagonist’s emotion is already known. Whereas
desires and beliefs are given in the emotion prediction
tasks, children have to work these out for themselves in
the case of emotion explanations. Thus, unlike emotion
predictions, emotion explanations appeal more to im-
aginative and creative problem solving capacities, which
will also have encouraged children to reason more
extensively about the topic. And as it turns out, by doing
so, deaf children included mental representations of
reality as often as hearing children. The fact that the
response pattern of deaf and hearing children was
compatible with respect to belief references is consistent
with the work of Clark, Schwanenflugel, Everhart, and
Bartini (1996). They concentrated on deaf adults’ or-
ganisation of cognitive verbs (knowing, thinking, etc.)
and concluded that deaf adults’ ToM is similar to that of
hearing adults.
Furthermore, deaf children’s references to desires
largely exceeded those of hearing children when they were
asked to explain the protagonist’s happiness, anger, or
sadness. These desire references among deaf children
even increased with age. More surprisingly, however,
deaf children’s references to desires occurred for both
typical and atypical emotions. This pattern differed from
that of the hearing group, because hearing children
referred more frequently to desires in the case of atypical
than typical emotions. A first question is why deaf
children used so many desire references. It could be
argued that understanding the subjectivity of desires can
be learned nonverbally as well, but that leaves unex-
plained why deaf children referred more frequently to
desires than hearing children. Maybe we should consider
the functionality of expressing desires to explain this
result. Vaccari and Marschark (1997) argued that hearing
parents are not fully responsive to their deaf children’s
needs, due to their lack of communication skills. More-
over, hearing caretakers show less patience with their
deaf child than do deaf caretakers (Wood, 1991). In other
words, deaf children who grow up in a hearing world
have limited interaction time and interaction means when
compared to their hearing siblings. The deaf children in
this research—with one exception—all had hearing
parents. Probably, deaf children with hearing parents are
likely to concentrate on an effective use of their in-
teraction time and they may primarily use this time to
ensure that others unambiguously understand what they
want: their desires. Any other approach might be
misunderstood. Note that the consequences for deaf
children are harder to overcome than for hearing children
if an implicit desire is misunderstood. Hearing children
can quite easily correct such a misunderstanding
(Meerum Terwogt, Rieffe, Tuijn, Harris, & Mant, 1999).
Maybe deaf children are as capable as hearing children in
this respect, but they might simply lack the interaction
time to do so. Thus, deaf children’s desire references
might very well be a part of their standard way of
communicating.
A second question is why deaf children, as opposed to
hearing children, did not distinguish between typical and
atypical emotions. Deaf children might be concentrating
on the expression of their own desires in their daily life, to
the extent that they—by default—also talk about desires
in cases where hearing children would leave the desire
implicit. Hearing children might reserve desire explan-
ations only for when they think that the situation asks for
them (see Introduction), as for example in the case of
atypical anger : ’’ He might have wanted something else ’’.
The content of children’s responses, however, shows a
difference between deaf and hearing children that goes
one step further : not a fundamental lack of understand-
ing, but a somewhat different perspective on the situation
by deaf children brings about their frequent desire refer-
ences. We will use the story about Linda, whose trip to
the zoo is cancelled by her mother (see Methods), as an
example.
In contrast with hearing children, one third of the deaf
children concentrated on how Linda is frustrated in her
desire by her mother to explain her typical anger : ‘‘Linda
is angry, she wants to go to the zoo, but mum says no,
mum is angry with Linda’’. Another third of the deaf
children concentrated on what Linda (still) wants and
they even elaborate on what she will be missing: ‘‘She is
angry, because she wants to go to the zoo, she wants to
see the monkeys’’, or ‘‘… she wants to pet the animals ’’.
Hearing children did not give these kinds of answers. It
seems as if deaf children—more strongly than hearing
children—identify themselves with Linda, instead of
judging the situation as an observer. Hearing children
mostly explained typical anger in terms of situational
factors. One third referred to the broken promise: ‘‘She is
angry, because they were going to the zoo at first and now
they aren’t going any more’’. In contrast, deaf children
never mentioned the broken promise. Their focus seems
somewhat limited. They get stuck in Linda’s initial desire,
without much consideration for external factors that
might have caused this situation. This explanation is
supported by the work of Gregory (1976), who showed
that in interactions between deaf and hearing conver-
sation partners, explanations of actions or emotional
reactions from both parties are less frequent and less
competent. Presumably, this tenacious attitude is an
influential factor in the frequently noted externalising
behavioural problems of deaf children (van Eldik, 1994;
Vostanis et al., 1997).
In conclusion, in our research deaf children appreciated
the fact that desires and beliefs govern emotions as well as
their hearing peer-group, but the manifestation of this
appreciation appeared to depend on the kind of re-
lationship that children want to establish with other
people. Deaf children grow up in a mainly hearing society
and, as such, their time and their means of communi-
cating with others is frequently restricted. Therefore, an
economic use of this time seems wise and their frequent
references to desires are defensible. Whereas hearing
children learn that desires can be left implicit, because ‘‘ it
goes without saying’’, it appears that deaf children have
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learned to explicitly refer to desires by default (in order to
avoid a possible misunderstanding). Deaf children ex-
plain other people’s emotions by means of desires
regardless of the typicality of that emotion.
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